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 Korean women’s minds, bodies, and histories have been used by both the South 
Korean and Japanese governments to further national political agendas since the 
promulgation of women’s education. Women’s education was portrayed as necessary for 
the good of the nation in Chosŏn Korea, and they were to use their education to become 
better mothers and wives. Women were to give birth to more children in order to literally 
create and mold the next generation of good citizens for the nation. After colonization by 
Japan, Korean women were expected to learn the values and ethics of a good imperial 
subject, and to pass them on to their children. Although many women took advantage of 
their new opportunities for education, ultimately their bid for independence through 
education was redirected toward nationalist endeavors. Women’s bodies were used as 
cheap sources of labor, and they often suffered abuse due to their inferior social status 
and inability to fight back against their oppressors. Finally, women’s bodies were used 
for Japanese soldiers’ sexual needs as Korean women were forced into sexual slavery 
under the comfort women system. These women suffered horribly in comfort stations, 
and were subjected to further pain and humiliation upon their return home, when many 
were rejected by their families for their supposed “defilement.” The comfort women’s 
stories have remained largely untold until the early 1990s when a more conducive social 
environment allowed many to step forward and finally tell their stories. Once again, 




to admit to participation in the comfort system and to this day contests its involvement. 
Furthermore, the humanitarians that are helping the comfort women pursue 
acknowledgment and compensation are only interested in telling the worst stories in order 
to construct a black and white paradigm of Japanese cruelty and aggression. This is not 
bringing justice to the history and lives of all comfort women, but once again using 
women for a political agenda. Women, past and present, have suffered long enough, and 
their lives should not be rewritten to serve a political agenda. 
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History is important. I doubt that many would argue this point, but few bother to 
remember it in times of crisis. Even fewer stop to contemplate how history affects current 
affairs and how history is appropriated for political agendas. History, as many have 
argued, is a moving target – it is relativistic. Different groups view the same historical 
issue or point in time from different perspectives, and accordingly, their recall of the 
event and the importance which they attach to it will be entirely different from, if not 
entirely opposed to, the recall of another group. In addition, oftentimes the tragedies of a 
set of victims will be used to further political agendas, forgetting the point of telling one’s 
experiences: to validate the victim’s pain and, if at all possible, ease it. Furthermore, 
political agendas also serve to muddy the waters of history and prevent a full 
understanding of the past, without which we cannot find reconciliation nor a path into the 
future. 
 Korea and Japan have a long and storied history of interaction; culturally, 
politically, and economically, they have both shared with each other and squabbled for as 
long as they have been in contact, with Korea viewing itself as “a neighboring nation that 
played the role of ‘big brother’ to Japan in the premodern history of the latter’s cultural 
development.”1 One might expect the two countries to share close relations politically. 
                                                           
1 C. Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in 





This is true to some extent, as the two operate as the closest allies of the United States in 
the Pacific region and are therefore tied together vis à vis their mutual ally. They also 
stand as two capitalist democratic countries facing the Communist forces of China and 
North Korea. However, the relationship between Japan and South Korea is notoriously 
tense and weighed down by history (Japan and North Korea share an even more harsh 
and unrelenting relationship, but as North Korea is a force unto itself in the world unlike 
any other country currently in existence, it shall be left out of this analysis). The 
memories of the colonial era and the war period cause strained foreign relations between 
the two East Asian democracies and have continued to be a source of friction in East Asia. 
Much vitriol has been spewed on both sides of the issue with regard to the colonization of 
the peninsula and the ongoing discussion of the comfort women used by the Japanese 
military in the Asia-Pacific War, a period which encompasses Japan’s invasion of China 
following the Manchurian Incident and ends with Japan’s defeat by the Allies. 
 South Korea has, since the end of colonization, utilized anti-Japanese sentiment to 
both create a nationalistic movement and to uphold legitimacy for its military regimes. 
Much of colonial history in Korea has been lost to the nationalistic discourse of Korean 
intellectuals and politicians who, in their quest to maintain power or win elections, have 
often ignored those parts of Korean history that make them uncomfortable or that 
complicate the issue. The Japanese government still attempts to elide parts of World War 
II from its history books and has offered insufficient apologies for atrocities committed 
during this period. The loser in all of this has almost always been women. The Japanese 
government certainly used Korean women for their own purposes throughout the colonial 





been oppressed by a patriarchal society created around Confucian ideals. While the 
Japanese used women’s bodies and minds for their own political agendas, Koreans also 
participated in the system, and continue to perpetuate this use of women today. Women’s 
lives, whether their newfound education during the colonial period, their labor for the 
colonial apparatus, or their time as military comfort women, are used by politicians today 
to further Korean nationalist agendas and to strengthen anti-Japanese sentiment among 
Koreans. The use of their stories in the discourse of today is not about the wide-ranging 
experiences of the women, it is about what their stories can do for the agenda. This is 
merely a continuation of the use of women’s mind and bodies for state purposes, masked 




EDUCATION AND LABOR 
 
Chosŏn Korea: Education and Women’s Place 
 Korean women have not always been held to be so inferior to men. Prior to 
Confucianization of the peninsula, women in Koryŏ Korea had many rights and 
privileges. Women could serve as nuns and were revered as bodhisattvas. They could 
divorce, remarry, and inherit property. They could marry, or not, as they wished.2 
Koreans practiced uxorilocal marriage, with the newly wedded groom moving in with the 
bride’s family.3 However, under Yi Sŏng-nye (1335-1408), the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-
1910) chose to restructure Korean society into a Confucian patriarchal hierarchy. 
 Under Confucianism, which was also transforming Japanese society during 
roughly the same time period, women were restricted to the inner quarters of the home 
and segregated from the opposite sex as much as possible. They were given the three 
obediences (samjong chido in Korean): obedience to their fathers before marriage, to 
their husbands after marriage, and to their sons after becoming widowed.4 They were to 
be kept ignorant, according to the Confucian principle of namhak yŏmang (learned men, 
                                                           
2 Theodore Jun Yoo, The Politics of Gender in Colonial Korea: Education, Labor, and 
Health, 1910-1945, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 19. 
 
3 Yoo, 20. 





ignorant woman),5 and whatever little learning they might have acquired was learned 
“from the books read aloud by my father or over my brother’s shoulder.”6 
 The forced opening of Korea with the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 created an 
impetus for change in society at large, as well as in women’s education.  Looking to the 
West and to Japan, Koreans saw women being educated and of an “equal” footing with 
men. This was, of course, equality in the sense of the times. Women were still expected 
to play their conservative role in the domestic sphere. Western missionary women, who 
would bring the beginnings of education to the women of Korea, were fairly cognizant of 
the shortcomings of their own societies. While Korean women exalted the “equal” status 
of Western men and women, one woman missionary commented on their misconceptions 
of Western society. Theodore Jun Yoo quotes:  
First, she argued that they had an “exaggerated and mistaken” idea of the 
“woman’s sphere and her ideals” in the West. The “free and independent” 
Western woman whom they sought to emulate could only be found “in novels, the 
plays, the police gazettes, and on the world’s great globe trotting highways”…The 
second misconception was their view of progress, liberty, and civilization.7 
 
 Whether or not their perceptions were accurate mattered not to those who 
believed that women’s education would further the modernization of the nation. Many 
believed that “the low status of women was a symbol of national backwardness, so that 
raising their status through education and legal reforms would enhance the overall level 
                                                           
5 Yoo, 39. 
 
6 Jiyoung Suh, “The “New Woman” and the Topography of Modernity in Colonial 
Korea,” Korean Studies 37 (2013), 16. 
 






of civilization and strength.”8 Women’s education, therefore, was viewed as a measure of 
“civilization” and “enlightenment.” The majority of men were not interested in educating 
women to place them on a truly equal footing.  
Education was also a means for a woman to perfect her performance of her 
household duties. Yu Kil-chun states, “If women are feeble and have little knowledge, 
they will have little hope of being equal to the importance of their duties.”9 An article in 
the Tongnip sinmun of 1899 laid out three reasons behind the importance of women’s 
education: “(1) the improvement of politics through husbands’ discussions with wise 
wives; (2) the beneficial development of the family through consultation with erudite 
wives; and (3) the existence of a ‘teaching mother’ who contributed to the education of 
her children before they enrolled in formal schooling.”10  Women’s education, then, was 
to better serve men and the patriarchy in the customary quarters of the home.  
Not all reformers believed that women’s education was simply to serve the nation, 
of course. There were some, like Sŏ Chae-p’il, who understood that men would resist the 
idea of unbalancing the hierarchy of power in society: “‘The life of a woman is not that 
inferior to men,’ because ‘men are not enlightened’ and only seek to use their physical 
strength to oppress women.”11 Another reformer stated: “Wives are called helpers at 
home….Unfortunately, however, women are looked down upon…Wives are treated as 
bondswomen who cook rice, wash clothes, or go on errands. How can wives be called 
                                                           
8 Kenneth M. Wells, “The Price of Legitimacy: Women and the Kŭnuhoe Movement, 
1927-1931” in Colonial Modernity in Korea. Eds. Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 198. 
9 Suh, 14.  
 







helpers of the home?”12 These men were few, and not powerful. The majority of men 
only saw women’s education as a means to an end. It was the missionaries, though, who 
first began the process of educating women. 
 When Protestant missionaries entered Korea following its opening, they met with 
the intense seclusion of women. Women they encountered in the streets were likely to 
flee their gaze, and Horace Allen even wrote of a woman who died from an illness rather 
than violate her modesty by seeing him.13 Over time, however, missionaries did 
experience success in getting women to attend their schools. Mary Scranton, the founder 
of the first girls’ school in Korea, stated that she must “get to the mothers before I can 
reach the daughters,” and knew that she must first instill a desire to learn in her 
prospective pupils. 14 Women became more interested in education and attendance at the 
missionaries’ schools and Bible studies grew. The pursuit of education was finally graced 
with the imperial blessing when Queen Min visited Mary Scranton’s school and renamed 
it Ewha haktang, thereby seeming to validate the endeavor.15 Public opinion began to 
change with this visit from a member of the royal family, and missionaries and their 
mission were more accepted. 
 With the success of private missionary schools, interest began to grow in creating 
public secular schools. One organization, the Ch’anyang-hoe (Promotion Society) 
founded the first secular girls’ school, the Sunsŏng Girl’s School, in December 1898. 
Unfortunately, when the founders of the school submitted a memorial to the king asking 
                                                           
12 Yoo, 43. 
 
13 Yoo, 46. 
 
14 Yoo, 46. 
 





for recognition of their school, a conservative Minister of Education and his cabinet 
blocked any approval from the emperor.16 Reformers might have believed that women’s 
education was a barometer of civilization and modernity, but clearly the conservative 
government was not yet willing to attempt to elevate women out of their Confucian 
oppression. The school did open in the hopes that they would receive funding later, but 
they did not, and closed down a mere three years after opening, in 1901. The government 
would not open a public girls’ school for higher learning until 1908, and even then few 
girls were qualified to enter. 
 Women were finally achieving some progress in acquiring education when the 
Japanese, having forced Korea to become a protectorate in 1905, issued a private school 
ordinance in 1908 requiring all private schools to adhere to governmental standards of 
education and obtain recognition. The expense and loss of freedom in choosing 
curriculum forced a large portion of private schools to shut down. Only a few received 
official government recognition. This opened the way for the colonial government, newly 
instated in 1910, to disseminate their own brand of education. 
 
Women’s Education in Colonial Korea and the New Woman 
 Once again, under colonial rule women’s education was used to further the aims 
of the nation. While missionary schools’ curriculum had contained a wealth of subjects 
(arithmetic, geography, composition, and English, for example, along with many subjects 
pertaining to womanly pursuits and household matters),17 the new Japanese curriculum 
                                                           
16 Yoo, 53. 
 






stressed moralistic behavior and loyalty to the imperial state. Shortly after the beginning 
of colonial rule, in August 1911, the colonial government issued Imperial Ordinance No. 
229: “The goal was to inculcate ‘moral character and general knowledge’ in the younger 
generation of Koreans to make them loyal subjects of imperial Japan.”18 According to 
Helen Kim as quoted by Theodore Jun Yoo, the new Japanese-imposed curriculum 
consisted of “137 lessons in morals…Out of these, fifty-eight lessons are on personality 
traits, such as patience, diligence, honesty, orderliness, faithfulness, and good 
manners.”19 The Japanese colonial government, at least in the initial years, was less 
interested in educating Koreans for practical subjects and much more interested in 
inculcating blind loyalty to the empire and in correcting those poor traits they viewed as 
overwhelmingly present in Koreans. 
 Women’s education was to be focused on improving the “good wife, wise mother” 
of contemporary discourse. According to Jiyoung Suh, the “good wife, wise mother” 
contained three aspects: “(1) a good educator of the children; (2) an efficient 
administrator of the household; and (3) a supportive wife who had an equal partnership 
with her husband.”20 Women were to be educated to this end, to be more effective 
helpmates to their husbands, and to correctly rear the next generation of Japanese 
imperial subjects. Furthermore, the creation of good, loyal citizens began in the home, 
and having an uneducated woman in charge of a child’s development could result in the 
                                                           
18 Yoo, 61. 
 
19 Yoo, 68. 
 






perpetuation of “superstitions of the past.”21 Mark Caprio quotes an article from a 1910 
issue of the Maeil sinbun: “It is not an overstatement to say that women’s education is 
tied to the rises and falls of the state. If women do not have morals, then boys cannot be 
strictly directed. Without this foundation, it will be too late after to make him excel in his 
education.”22 It is to be noted that the education of girls is not mentioned in this 
exhortation. The education of mothers was exclusively for the benefit of the boys they 
would be raising; the girls were irrelevant and would play their part when the time came 
for them to perform the same function. 
This inherently presented a contradiction as women entered the public sphere and 
were told that their education would aim to create equality with men. What was 
advertised as an attempt to free women from the confines of the inner quarters and allow 
them social liberation was in actuality yet another method for the patriarchy to control 
women and relegate them once more to the private sphere. 
 In the first decade of Japanese imperial rule, most women did not seem to see this 
contradiction. New Women, at that time meaning women educated above a secondary 
school level,23 rarely protested against the co-optation of women’s education by yet 
another patriarchal trope intending to utilize women’s minds to produce more male heirs 
and citizens worthy of the state. One of the few New Women to recognize the oppression 
inherent in the “good wife, wise mother” ideal was Na Hye-sŏk. She “denounced the idea 
of the ‘wise mother and good wife’ as a male-dominant ideology made to breed domestic, 
                                                           
21 Mark Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945, (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2009), 97. 
 
22 Caprio, 97. 
 





docile, and submissive women, one that would ultimately enslave them to societal 
patriarchy.”24  
That is not to say, of course, that women were not actively participating in debates 
about the meaning and intent of the “good wife, wise mother,” or about women’s 
emancipation. However, liberation at this point meant “liberation from an old home and 
achievement of a new home”25; in other words, the liberation these women sought was 
merely the same repression with a new face. (It would be wise to take a moment here to 
mention that the vast majority of women participating in and contributing to these 
movements and debates were not of the lower class. That does not mean that lower class 
women were not conscious of their own repression, if not phrased as such.) 
 The idea of “women’s liberation” as “an awakening of modern gender 
consciousness” had begun to appear around the time of the March 1st, 1919 movement.26 
By the 1920s, women began to develop a more individualist perception of liberation. The 
Modern Girl, apart from the New Woman, began to emerge shortly thereafter. She 
differed from the New Woman, according to Miriam Silverberg, in that “the cerebral 
New Woman had been romantic rather than realistic; she had wielded ideals, not 
economics; she had imitated male habits instead of attempting to create a separately 
bounded life for women.”27  
The first mention in the mass media of the Modern Girl was in a 1927 issue of the 
                                                           
24 Suh, 19. 
 
25 Suh, 19. 
 
26 Suh, 19. 
 
27 Miriam Silverberg, Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The Mass Culture of Japanese Modern 





Chosŏn ilbo.28 Suh points out that the image of the Modern Girl was almost a direct 
composite of all of the supposed negative traits of a New Woman, sharing qualities of 
“frivolity, shallowness, [and] carelessness.”29 These women, these new Modern Girls, 
took the idea of liberation at its word and did not pay homage to the “good wife, wise 
mother” trope. They aimed for true social, political, and economic liberation and did not 
conform to the traditional image of a woman tethered to her family, which made them 
inherently threatening to men.  
The Modern Girl also stood for things new and modern, and in an era of rapid 
modernization and industrialization at the hands of the Japanese colonial government, 
many Korean men clung to what was left of the traditional patriarchy. The loss of power 
to a foreign invader also caused a serious blow to men’s self-esteem and sense of 
masculinity. As Kenneth M. Wells writes: 
 Suffice it to say that the humiliation engendered by the Japanese removal of the 
traditional male elite’s prerogative to rule and the consequent subjugation of 
Korean men rendered them extremely sensitive to any suggestion of loss of 
prerogatives in the home, let alone any call for Korean women to assert 
themselves against Korean men.30 
 
Men’s egos were at stake, and the repression of the colonial regime was passed on to the 
women. As Chungmoo Choi writes, “colonized males adopt the stance of the colonizer as 
a way of recuperating their masculinity.”31 The Modern Girl further emasculated Korean 
                                                           
28 Suh, 21. 
 
29 Suh, 21. 
 
30 Wells, 202. 
 
31 Chungmoo Choi, “Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea” in Dangerous 
Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism. Eds. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi. (New York: 






men, and so she was torn down. 
As the Modern Girl removed herself from the traditional home and entered the 
public sphere, she also removed herself from the last vestiges of control the male 
patriarchy could really exercise in society. To discredit the Modern Girl and regain some 
measure of lost control over women’s bodies and behaviors, the Modern Girl was vilified 
and over-sexualized. Accused of excess promiscuity and vanity, she was disdained for 
her enjoyment of consumer culture. Furthermore, many speculated on her sexual exploits 
without proof; promiscuity was based upon her style of dress and mannerisms. Kitamura 
Kaneko mockingly sums up the hyper-sexualized perception of the Modern Girl:  
She went for a walk with a man in Nara Park; I spotted a glimpse of her at a 
Dōtonbori café; she was kicking up her heels at the dance hall; I discovered her 
going into the movies. When I watched her walking she was moving her left and 
right legs one after the other; I saw her yawning and decided she was tired out 
from waiting for a man; she’d decorated her hat with a flower – I wonder who she 
got it from. She sneezed, she must be run down from being with a man; etc.; etc.; 
etc.; etc.; etc.; etc.; etc.32 
 
While Silverberg and Kitamura are referencing Japanese Modern Girls, the same is true 
of their Korean counterparts. The activities described were common activities, yet they 
were still subject to the male gaze and interpretation. The Modern Girls did not conform 
to the socially approved idea of liberation and so they were treated as transgressors. 
As mentioned above, men felt distinctly threatened by the potential loss of power 
in the domestic sphere should the women step onto the public stage. The answer was then 
to discredit her and her movement by labeling her licentious, unchaste, and unpatriotic. 
Chungmoo Choi writes: “When that threat comes from women, these women are 
                                                           






relegated to the status of ‘whores,’”33 which is exactly how the Modern Girls were treated. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to say if these women were truly guilty of all of 
the sins with which they were accused. Most likely they were not. As Kitamura is 
satirizing, many of the judgments made concerning Modern Girls revolved around 
innocent acts and the negative perceptions that came to be associated with the women 
themselves. Just because a woman wore a short skirt did not mean that she was sleeping 
around, though this is the linkage that was made in the eyes of many male spectators 
(women as well). Since the source material we have comes from witnesses to the 
phenomenon, and not from the Modern Girls themselves, we may never know what these 
women believed or wished to achieve for themselves. Their actions could just as easily 
have been politically motivated as they could have been an expression of pure self-
interest, or both. According to many contemporary accounts, they were like “‘floating 
grass,’ with no political views but provocatively beautiful with their Western clothes and 
hairstyles.”34 
 Yet the Modern Girl was not the end of an awakening of political consciousness 
among the women’s liberation movement, despite her supposed lack of interest in politics 
or gender liberation. New Women began to call for actual, individual liberation. The 
backlash against women’s quest for equality took two forms: first, in a glorification of the 
Old-Fashioned Woman who had been tossed aside as ignorant and useless to the 
civilization project because of her lack of education at the beginning of Korea’s 
modernization; and second, in the subsuming of the women’s liberation movement under 
nationalism. 
                                                           
33 Choi, “Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea,” 25. 
 





 Society as a whole began to backpedal as New Women demanded more rights. 
The Old-Fashioned Woman, formerly a pitiable figure trapped in the darkness of the 
inner quarters, was talked of in a new light. A sense of nostalgia can be glimpsed in some 
of the commentaries and articles of the times as people attempted to revert back to a time 
when women demurely and obediently refrained from entering the public sphere where 
they could shake up the comfortable patriarchy. A 1926 article in the Tonga ilbo asked 
which contributed more to the family, the Old-Fashioned Woman or the New Woman. 
Three women took each side, and in the end, the paper’s audience deemed the Old-
Fashioned Woman to be the winner “in the long run.”35 These women were now the 
caretakers of the traditional values of “chastity, dutifulness, frugality, and sacrifice,”36 
traits which the Modern Girl conspicuously lacked. In a roundtable talk, in a 
confrontation between New Women and Old-Fashioned Women, each accused the other 
of exactly the traits with which the patriarchal discourse had labeled them. New Women 
attacked Old-Fashioned Women’s “subordination to Confucian conventions and blam[ed] 
them for being mere sexual appendages to men.”37 Old-Fashioned Women fired back 
with New Women’s “extravagance, vanity, clumsy housekeeping, and misbehavior that 
discredited promising men and caused family trouble.”38 Even in discussions among 
women about their own attributes and roles in society, a large portion of the debate was 
centered on their relations to men, allowing the invisible patriarchy to take a hand in the 
formulation of their own identities. 
                                                           
35 Suh, 27. 
 
36 Suh, 22. 
 
37 Suh, 27. 
 





 The patriarchy attempted another method of regaining control: a redirection of 
women’s energy back into domesticity. The new buzzwords were “efficient” and 
“professional.” To go along with women’s new desire for education, domesticity was 
reformulated into a professional science, combining the modernity of New Women with 
the domestic virtues of Old-Fashioned Women. Whereas household work had previously 
been viewed as “drudgery,”39 it was now characterized by practicality and efficiency: 
“She would be a hyŏnmyŏng chŏnŏp chubu (wise and prudent professional wife), 
motivated less by filiality than by common sense in meeting the practical needs of her 
nuclear family, especially the education and upbringing of her sons.”40 Hygiene and 
economy were prized in this discourse to create a new nonthreatening, professional 
housewife. As Theodore Jun Yoo states, “The application of bourgeois virtues like thrift, 
simplicity, hygiene, and knowledge of economics were critical to the professionalization 
of housewifery.”41 Furthermore, these attributes could be accessed even by the lower 
classes who, as Ch’ae Maria, an educated New Woman, believed, lacked the ability to 
attain higher education to live “rational or ideal”42 lives as the middle class and elites 
could. While their current practices were of the previous era, these women could be 
educated on hygiene and proper housekeeping techniques and so through their 
domesticity access the supposed liberation that more educated women could achieve 
through other means. 
 Men returning from their studies abroad wanted women educated at the same 
                                                           
39 Yoo, 85. 
 
40 Yoo, 85. 
 
41 Yoo, 87. 
 





level. However, the subjects they learned were, of course, different. Women’s courses 
focused on home economics. In regard to men’s wish for college educated spouses, 
Jihang Pak notes, “In response to this demand, the home economics department was set 
up to prepare Ewha women as desirable brides by teaching them how to cook western 
food. Understandably, the department soon acquired the nickname of the department of 
the daughter-in-law.”43 Women were attending college to learn to be the equal and proper 
helpmates of their husbands in private while he performed as the power-holder in public. 
 Once again, women’s role in the home was linked to nationalism. As earlier stated, 
women were to be educated for the nation when the idea of women’s education first 
began to surface. It was a measure of the civilization of the country. Now that Korea was 
colonized, women’s education and liberation would be used to uphold the nation. 
Reformers once again preached that women were the source of good citizens, both in 
birthing new sons and in educating them in the home before sending them off to school. 
Keeping a clean and efficient household was part and parcel of this duty. Yoo writes, 
“…reformers sought to raise the ideology of housework to a higher plane, distinguishing 
it from the drudgery of the past and linking it to improvement in the nation’s standard of 
living. In other words, the recreation of the nation was to start in the home.”44 
Nationalism and performing one’s duty to the nation became ideological tools to restrain 
women’s true liberation and keep them in the private sphere, where they might have as 
much power over the home as they liked.  
 Following the March 1st movement, nationalism gained a stronger hold over the 
population of colonial Korea. Liberation from the Japanese regime became the utmost 
                                                           
43 Yoo, 88. 
 





goal of nationalist reformers, and therefore, women’s liberation movements had no place 
in the discourse. For these nationalists, “the call for female emancipation was a highly 
selfish act,”45 distracting from the goal of liberation for the entirety of the Korean people. 
When newly educated New Women, such as Na Hye-sŏk, Kim Wŏn-ju, Kim Myŏng-sun, 
and other vocal women’s liberation movement participants, had begun to step outside the 
bounds of the domestic “liberation” that had initially been allowed them, men reacted by 
attempting to suppress the changes they were demanding. Kenneth M. Wells notes, 
 Although social change was still desired, most Korean male activists felt obliged 
to resist the social changes that the colonial regime was effecting and became 
intolerant of women’s movements that could not be readily used to discomfort the 
enemy or aid national liberation…the normal male reluctance to surrender 
traditional prerogatives over women was exacerbated by the perception – or 
reality – that under the colonial system women, unlike men, stood to gain from 
social change.46 
 
The colonial regime gave women the opportunity for greater education and thereby 
greater social and economic power, albeit for the purpose of creating better imperial 
subjects, and this quite clearly disturbed Korean men. Add to that the oppression and 
degradation of colonization, and men felt quite stung by the idea of women attempting to 
wrest away their own liberation from the system. 
 The easiest way to halt women’s liberation movements was to subsume them 
under the overall nationalist discourse. Kyeong-Hee Choi poetically writes, “Since then, 
far from having too little, Korean women perhaps have had too much of the nation. In 
fact, they have lost their face as women in order to wear the mask of nationality, only to 
                                                           
45 Yoo, 79. 
 





find that in everyday life they must function only as women.”47 Viewed as selfish and 
corrupt, women’s liberation movements were torn down and used by nationalist 
reformers for the reformer’s own purposes. “Nationalist reformers needed the support of 
the new women to promote a new patriarchy refashioned to meet the exigencies of the 
day”48; we therefore see the discourse of the housewife turned professional, efficient, and 
hygienically sound as well as the sudden trumpeting of the patriotism of these women.  
 In theory, women would experience liberation once the nation experienced 
liberation. They were essentially told to sit down, be quiet, and assist in the liberation of 
the nation instead of being overly concerned with their own personal freedom. Their 
education was not for them to make waves by vociferously entering the public fray, but to 
make them better able to help create the nation. Socialists took the same position, except 
they viewed the situation from a class perspective: “For the real struggle was not between 
men and women but between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It would be hard to find 
a clearer dismissal of a feminist gender position.”49 Women had little choice between the 
two; women’s liberation was not of concern to those creating the public discourse. Their 
education was not for them, but for the men of the nation. 
 
Women’s Labor: Bodies for the Nation 
 Having now discussed how women’s education, and therefore their minds, was to 
be used by the Japanese colonial government and by Korean men, it is important to 
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discuss how women’s bodies themselves were to be used. First, women were essentially 
the incubators of the people. They were to breed the next generation. Second, women 
were used for labor in the industrialization process and also in war materiel factories in 
the later years of the Asia-Pacific War; and third, which will be discussed at length in the 
last portion of this paper, women’s bodies were used to “comfort” Japanese soldiers 
during the war years as “comfort women.” 
 As has already been stated, women were to mold the next generation of imperial 
subjects. They were to cultivate their minds in the home, making the schooling children 
later received even more effective, in theory. However, it was not merely the shaping of 
young minds in which mothers were expected to take part; they were also the literal 
creators of those minds. 
 Women’s purpose as a glorified incubator can be traced as far back as the national 
founding myth. The founder of Korea, Tan’gun, was supposedly the son of Hwanung, 
“the illegitimate son of Hwaning, the heavenly lord, and Wungnyŏ (which literally means 
a “bear-woman”).”50 Wungnyŏ, a bear, desired to become human so greatly that she lived 
in “a cave without sunlight and [ate] garlic for one hundred days”51 as part of a test. Upon 
passing this test, Hwanung agreed to make her human, and she bore him a son: Tan’gun. 
The woman herself is only important in so far as she is the mother of Tan’gun, 
“suggesting that woman’s only contribution to the creation of the Korean nation was the 
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provision of a proto-nationalist womb.”52 Wungnyŏ is also less than human: whereas 
Hwanung is descended from heaven, Wungnyŏ began life as a bear. From the very 
beginning of the nation then, according to this myth, woman was not of a level with man. 
 In the Chosŏn period, this inferiority of women was institutionalized in the 
patrilineal system. Women’s names did not appear in family registries, and many did not 
have given names.53 A woman was listed only by the position she held within the family: 
“She would be listed in genealogies as the daughter of her father. Informally she would 
be known by her social position (new bride, daughter-in-law), by teknonymy (Suni’s 
mother), or geonymy (the girl from Pusan).”54 All last names were according to the 
family surname (sŏng) and place of origin of the line’s originating ancestor (pon’gwan). 
This was a patrilineal bloodline relationship, and those with the same sŏng and pon’gwan 
could not marry, no matter how distant the kinship, because they purportedly descended 
from the same ancestor. Only those with the same sŏng and pon’gwan could be adopted 
into the household should the head of household not have a male heir. While families of 
younger brothers, etc., could branch off, they still retained the name of the bloodline, and 
villages often sprang up out of these partitioned households, as they remained nearby. It 
is noticeable that women did not factor into this at all. In Korea, they were not allowed to 
inherit a head of household position; there was always a son or an adoptee to inherit. 
Although in the latter years of colonization the Japanese revised the Decree on 
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Korean Civil Affairs to mandate the Korean adoption of Japanese surnames and therefore 
the Japanese ie household system, not much changed for the women. While Koreans 
were expected to maintain their family registers according to the Japanese koseki system, 
even as late as 1942 only about half had actually registered,55 demonstrating Koreans’ 
unwillingness to forsake their traditional method of organizing households and registries. 
The head of household system in Korea was further institutionalized in the postwar 
period by Koreans themselves, in the hojuje system, after Korea had been freed from the 
Japanese colonial presence, and was in fact not abolished until 2005.  
Women’s importance in the Korean patrilineal system was directly related to the 
men in their lives and dependent on whether or not they had born sons, and they had few 
rights of their own. Janice Kim writes, “A woman was not considered to be a permanent 
member of the household of her birth and, at best, obtained a secondary position in her 
husband’s household after she bore a son.”56 She was of value only after she had proved 
her worth by birthing an heir. 
 Late in the colonial period, after the outbreak of war with China in 1937, the 
Japanese colonial government began stridently pushing for women to give birth to more 
children to boost the population. The Japanese Government-General instituted a policy of 
umeyo fuyaseyo (to give birth and multiply),57 advocating women’s production of more 
men for the empire. As with most countries, with the coming of war, citizens were 
encouraged to do all they could to assist the war efforts and to fulfill their duties as 
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subjects. From things as simple as walking instead of taking the bus to their own personal 
health,58 women were urged to do their duty. Advertisements “encouraged pregnancy and 
congenial family relations.”59 Caprio gives an example of one such advertisement: “a 
group of women sitting in a circle contemplating getting pregnant by the end of February, 
their last chance to give birth to a son during the year of the tiger.”60 Men born in that 
year would be “fierce fighters.”61 The message is clear: women were to produce subjects 
for the empire, and more specifically, soldiers for the coming war efforts, their bodies 
merely fields for the sowing of seed. A Mother-Child Protection Law was then enacted in 
1937. Officials became concerned over the falling birth rate, and subsequently, birth 
control was prohibited. Following this, in 1942, an Outline for Establishing Population 
Growth Policy was established. The woman’s reproductive system was now “under the 
‘direct control of the state.’”62 
 Women’s bodies were also used for manual labor in factories. These women were 
not of the elite class and were rarely of the educated middle class, at least until the 
outbreak of war. The majority of them were poor and uneducated, coming from rural 
homes. The opportunity for work for pay outside the home was not one that they would 
have had prior to Japanese colonization. Rural women of course were not able to remain 
confined to the household as prescribed. They worked the fields and bartered in the 
marketplace, in many ways allowing them more freedom than their elite counterparts. As 
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Janice Kim points out, women labored in and around the home nearly constantly:  
Korean peasant women generally made all the clothing in the household, prepared 
the meals, husked and cleaned the rice, carried “heavy loads on their heads,” and 
drew water in “remote districts works in fields”...In spite of the fact that 
womanhood and labor were separated in Confucian ideology, in reality, the 
Korean woman was “nothing but a drudge, until she could transfer her drudgery 
to her daughter-in-law.”63 
 
Working in the factories at least provided an opportunity for wages. Some women went 
to the factories seeking economic independence, but most went in order to support their 
families. By leaving the household to obtain jobs, these women, young girls really, not 
only took the burden of providing for them off their parents’ shoulders, but they also 
supported the household from afar by sending back portions of their wages. Many also 
were working toward their own dowries. 
 Women’s entrance into the work force was not heralded by sudden equality in the 
workplace. Women more often than not entered highly gendered industries. Women were 
found overwhelmingly in the textile industry, where their “delicate and nimble fingers”64 
were more suited to tasks such as silk-reeling. The industrialists and the media frequently 
exalted such feminine traits as “patience, agility, sharpness, and endurance”65 that 
enabled the women to perform the most tedious, repetitive, and labor-intensive work. 
They were praised in newspaper and journal reports on factory work, one reporter 
exclaiming, “Go and see for yourself…The female worker’s hand speed is unbelievable! 
You cannot follow their hand [movement] with your eyes! This requires dexterity!”66 
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Backbreaking work which could permanently disable workers with back and neck 
injuries was lauded as mere testament to the women’s gendered skills. Women, as 
unskilled and therefore disposable labor, were often assigned the more dangerous tasks, 
such as sinking their hands in scalding water to catch at silken threads.67  
 Although women signed contracts before entering these jobs, the contracts were 
highly favorable to the company and gave them almost unthinkable power over the 
women. The wages that women were to receive for subjecting themselves to such 
dangerous and demanding work were used to control the women as they could be cut at a 
moment’s notice. Wages were cut as penalties or if the quality of work was not up to par, 
which could easily be the result of faulty machinery.68 Wages could also be held as part 
of a compulsory savings program, which women would never see if they left their 
contracts early. The end result was that the women had very little to live on, much less 
send back home to support their families. However, their work enabled the factories to 
continue producing at maximum profit, completely disregarding the health and wellbeing 
of its employees. 
 When absenteeism and breakage of contracts became a problem, the use of 
dormitories for workers increased.69 Women shared extremely small spaces. Laundry and 
bathing facilities were frequently insufficient, even if they found time to wash themselves 
or their clothes. They were confined to the dormitories and were rarely allowed outside 
the compound, except to walk to work. They also suffered deprivations unique to women 
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as their menstrual periods were not taken into account. Given only two sets of clothes for 
the year, they were not provided undergarments as it was not necessary for the men, and 
therefore believed to be unnecessary for the women as well.70 This meant that if women 
menstruated, they suffered the humiliation of bearing blood stains in front of their male 
co-workers and the discomfort of the dried blood. Women were able to smuggle supplies 
such as raw cotton into the dormitories from the factories, but were punished with 
beatings and penalties should they be caught.71 Factory conditions were not always 
horrible, as testimonies of employees of the Fujikoshi Steel Company attest,72 but the 
majority suffered tremendously in their jobs.  
 It is important to remember, however, that factory jobs were not the only type of 
labor that women entered into during this period. Women’s education was open as never 
before, although only fifty percent of the school-aged population ultimately attended 
school by 1940.73 Due to this education, women were able to enter other portions of the 
job market, like the service sector where many worked as clerks, waitresses, etc. Some 
worked as maids or domestic servants.74 Whatever their job, these women gained the 
opportunity to strike out on their own and become economically independent. The 
experience they gained proved invaluable later in life. The depiction of working class 
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women during the colonial period in Korean nationalist history, however, is 
overwhelmingly of those factory girls who suffered at the hands of industrialists (though 
the industrialists discussed are Japanese, and the Korean industrialists who equally took 
advantage of those women are not mentioned). While their suffering deserves recognition, 
it is not the only story in this history. 
 
The Chŏngsindae 
Following the Manchurian Incident, women began to move into heavy industries 
in which they had been scarce before, industries such as chemicals, mining, machines, 
and machine tools, working for companies such as the aforementioned Fujikoshi. While 
these industries had previously been deemed too labor intensive for women, who were 
more valued for their reproductive capacity anyway, with men moving into “large scale 
highly sophisticated heavy industrial factories,”75 positions opened up for women in the 
unskilled labor portions, which they then filled. After 1937, women also began filling 
skilled jobs as well as clerical positions in heavy industries.76 
Soon, even having an increasing number of women in the workforce proved 
insufficient in the face of wartime needs. The colonial government began recruiting 
students around 1938, with one of the first recorded recruitment projects being the Task 
concerning the Establishment of Labor Duties for Students.77 Immediately before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, the national registration system was enacted 
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in November of that year. Men between the ages of sixteen and forty were registered, as 
well as unmarried women between sixteen and twenty-five; the women were never 
drafted, though.78 It was not until 1944 that a plan was put in place to utilize women’s 
labor more efficiently: the Woman’s Volunteer Labor Corps was created. 
The word for the labor corps in Japanese is Teishintai, meaning “voluntarily 
submitting or offering” (tei) “body” (shin) “corps” (tai). The Korean direct translation is 
chŏngsindae. The full name was Yŏja Kŭllo Chŏngsindae.79 The corps was voluntary, as 
the name implies, and unmarried women aged twelve to thirty-nine were eligible. The 
corps was not the first time the term “chŏngsin” had been used, though. According to C. 
Sarah Soh, “Originally, this particularistic term Chŏngsin, conjuring up the spirit of 
patriotic sacrifice, was used to refer to a variety of ad hoc organizations of students, 
farmers, housewives, and other ordinary citizens, whose members were mobilized to 
support the war efforts of Imperial Japan.”80 So the idea of a patriotic sacrifice was not 
new to the women being called upon to serve. In fact, many women did view admission 
into the corps exactly how it was promoted. Yu Kwangnyŏl “argued that young women 
called to become volunteers should consider the offer ‘honorable,’ since the group 
represented the best qualities of ‘model employees’ and patriots.”81 While a group 
seeking educated young women of the middle class may have been what was advertised, 
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in reality, standards of admission were low and almost all comers were accepted.82 Once 
again, the use of women’s bodies for labor is depicted as patriotic duty to the nation. 
By 1990, however, with the foundation of the Korean Council, the term 
chŏngsindae lost its precise meaning and has now become associated with the comfort 
women. The term chŏngsindae in actuality refers solely to those women drafted under the 
1944 Ordinance on Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps. Women did join movements before, 
such as the Patriotic Labor Corps, but these women would not have been chŏngsindae.  
There are a variety of reasons as to the cause of this unwanted word association, 
beginning with the factory girls of prewar colonial Korea. Due to the extreme disparity in 
power relations on the factory floor, the occurrence of sexual harassment or rape by 
factory managers and foremen was high: “male managers often seduced or raped the 
young girls, and for many this resulted in miscarriages, abortions, or stillbirths.”83 
Factory workers had no one to turn to. The police who should have protected them often 
did nothing or punished the victim. Those who did speak up were publicly humiliated. 
Few cases ever ended in the victim’s favor.84  
Reports of this abuse abounded. It is no wonder that the public grew deeply 
suspicious of the safety of the factories: “The general public sentiment was that young 
girls lost their virginity and honor to the factories. Factories were becoming synonymous 
with sexual slavery.”85 To this day, as Soh remarks, the use of the term chŏngsindae to 
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refer to comfort women “reflects but also has reinforced the depth and strength of 
lingering suspicions on the part of Koreans about the abuse of Chŏngsindae as a 
convenient mechanism to deceptively recruit comfort women.”86 It is in the vein of an 
oft-repeated story that has become truth in the public consciousness. Like the myth that a 
cricket chirps by rubbing its legs together (it rubs its wings), the idea that the 
chŏngsindae were frequently deceived into becoming comfort women or were in any way 
comfort women has permeated public discourse on the comfort women issue. 
 Yet, there is some truth to the tales. While evidence of chŏngsindae-turned-
comfort women is hard to come by, there have been a few to come forward. In her study 
of more than one hundred cases, C. Sarah Soh found only two that could be labeled “real” 
chŏngsindae-turned-comfort women.87  Even the presence of one, however, lends some 
truth to the matter and supports the discourse.  
 Finally, though one of the founders of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for 
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (shortened to Korean Council), Yun Chŏng-ok, has said, 
“But there existed the Chŏngsindae that only labored and had nothing to do with sexual 
matters…When we speak of Chŏngsindae to mean military comfort women, we cause a 
considerable trouble to them,”88 the term continues to be used officially by the 
organization. It is claimed, though, that the term represents cultural sensitivity toward the 
survivors. The word that most accurately represents comfort women, wianbu (the Korean 
translation of the Japanese term ianfu), is deemed unsuitable as it evokes “[a] negative 
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image of prostitutes.”89 Wianbu also refers to the prostitutes in South Korea who are 
currently servicing the American military personnel. In order to distance these former 
comfort women from the profession of prostitution, the Council adopted the term 
chŏngsindae, despite its inaccuracy. 
 For the women who worked solely as chŏngsindae in the true sense of the word, 
this “cultural sensitivity” is not very sensitive at all. These women have been “doubly 
wronged.”90 Not only did they suffer under the colonial regime, but now their identities 
are being snatched away from them, lumping them in with a category for which they feel 
shame. Comfort women have historically had a difficult time in postliberation Korea, 
although “difficult” might be an understatement. As will be discussed later, the comfort 
women were shunned and viewed as defiled when they returned home. Coming from this 
era, these women do not want to be associated with something they view as shameful. 
When filing a lawsuit against Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, the women chose to hide their 
names and their faces to avoid being associated with the comfort women.91 
 This is another instance of the women’s narrative being adjusted to fit with a 
political agenda. The term chŏngsindae, now equated with the deception and forced 
recruitment of comfort women, evokes greater international feeling and support for the 
comfort women’s cause than if they had merely been mostly voluntary labor. Those who 
attempt to point out the flaws in this terminology are summarily ignored, or silenced. 
When Jee Man-wŏn, a military analyst and conservative critic, accused the Korean 
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Council of the “crime of distorting history”92 and of possibly misappropriating funds, the 
Council responded swiftly: a legal battle ensued and a petition was begun to aid the “true” 
chŏngsindae survivors.93 However good-intentioned the appropriation of the term 
chŏngsindae in the comfort women narrative may be, misusing the term is not only an 
injustice to the histories of the comfort women themselves, but also to the real 
chŏngsindae, in the original sense of the term. 
 Having now discussed at length the appropriation of women’s minds and bodies 
for the purposes of the colonial government and the pre-existing Korean patriarchy, and 
concluded with the conflation of the terms chŏngsindae and “comfort woman,” it is time 
to focus more acutely on the comfort women themselves, one of the largest and most 
visible of the historical issues that continue to loom over the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan. The remaining portion of this paper will be dedicated solely to these 
women.
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THE COMFORT WOMEN 
 
A Brief History 
Korean men were used as labor and as soldiers, while Korean women were used 
as labor in factories and as “comfort women,” exploited during the war as a race below 
the Japanese.  There is no question that the comfort woman system existed; the dispute 
lies in where blame lies for the heinous system and exactly how much blame the 
perpetrators should carry. Before broaching the complicated ongoing debate and political 
repercussions of the comfort women system between South Korea and Japan, one must 
understand the origins of the system itself. 
 Comfort women stations sprang up as early as 1932,94 long before the Asia-
Pacific War began. They proliferated following the Nanjing Massacre in 1937-38, 
springing up wherever Japanese soldiers went. Documentation has been found by 
Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chuo University that the military and the Japanese 
government collaborated to bring these comfort stations into being95 on the theory that 
they would prevent a reoccurrence of such scenes of mass rape and murder as were 
witnessed in China. As men needed to have sex and expend sexual energy, especially 
following the adrenaline rush and fear after a battle, it was only logical that the military 
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provide its men with a means to satisfy that basic primal urge. It would also, it was 
believed, prevent the spread of venereal disease among the troops, which could 
potentially cut down significant numbers of men and officers for lengthy periods of time. 
Neither of these aims was actually achieved, as soldiers continued to rape where they 
could and venereal disease continued to spread. It is an incredibly blind assumption to 
believe that attempting to confine sex to certain designated partners would prevent 
sexually transmitted diseases, as the men were more often the transmitters as they moved 
from station to station and woman to woman. It was also naïve to believe that the men 
confined their sexual activities exclusively to the comfort stations, which were usually 
fairly expensive for a common soldier’s monthly salary. Nevertheless, the number of 
comfort stations grew, many of them springing up close to the forefront of battle. 
 Conditions for the comfort women steadily declined as the war progressed and 
Japan lost ground. Women who had previously been somewhat removed from the 
battleground were moved closer to the action, putting their lives in danger along with the 
soldiers they were forced to service. When the war finally ended and Japan was defeated, 
many women found themselves abandoned in a foreign land. Hwang Kŭmju recounts her 
abandonment:  
One evening there was no call for supper. There seemed to be nobody around, and 
it was strangely silent…There was not a single human being in sight. Then, as I 
was drinking some water a soldier appeared. He said he had returned after he had 
been sent on an errand to some far away, remote mountain, only to find the unit 
deserted. He said he had been left a memo from his officer telling him to leave 
this place immediately.96 
 
 Some were massacred as the Japanese troops fled. Soh describes the treatment of 
                                                           







specifically non-Japanese comfort women, as the Japanese women were informed and 
moved along with the troops where the others were not and were instead left to their fates 
or killed: “Many Korean comfort women were simply abandoned, and it has been 
reported that in some extreme cases the retreating Japanese army killed the women by 
driving them into trenches or caves where they bombed, burned, or shot them, creating 
mass graves on the spot.”97 In some cases, then, the abandoned were the lucky ones. 
Whether the Japanese killed these women to cover their tracks once the enemy forces had 
breached their lines, knowing full well that the kidnapping and coercion of women as sex 
slaves defied international law, or they simply did not wish to have the added burden of 
women following as they fled, their treatment of the Korean (and Chinese and other 
ethnicities) comfort women speaks to their disregard for those women.  
This disregard for the humanity of the women was not something new as the 
Japanese army broke down. From the beginning, the women’s movements had been 
recorded on transport lists as “munitions” or “canteen supplies.”98 As women, and 
specifically as non-Japanese women, they did not even register as people, but as simple 
supplies for the troops’ needs. The women were transported like munitions and then were 
used as munitions, more often than not beaten, raped, and assaulted with deadly weapons, 
suffering permanent damage to their bodies and their minds, and were then left to fend 
for themselves in foreign, war-torn territories. The tragedy did not end with liberation, 
however. The women suffered upon their return home as well. 
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The Comfort Women and Korea 
 In Korea, Korean women’s compatriots were eager to ignore the former comfort 
women at best and to denigrate and shame them at worst. Many of the women returned 
home to find themselves shunned for their “defilement” regardless of the coercion 
employed. Any discussion or admission of the violence they suffered could result in 
ostracism from their family. As Keith Howard points out: “To the Koreans around them, 
they were neither faithful nor chaste. They were not exemplary women. The families of 
comfort women feared the ostracism they would suffer if the shameful past was 
discovered; the women became an extra burden, and there was little chance to marry 
them off.”99 The women’s pain was ignored as their objectification as men’s damaged 
property was more important than their physical or mental suffering.  
As mentioned earlier, Korea has a long past of patriarchal domination and 
repression stemming from Confucianism. To reiterate, under Confucianism, women are 
reduced to the three obediences: “obedience to the father as a daughter, obedience to the 
husband as a wife, and obedience to the son as a widow.”100 Women were held under the 
heel of some man for the duration of their lives, never independent, never able to make 
their own decisions regarding their bodies or their lives; the only power they wielded was 
the influence they might have over their sons and husbands. They were confined to the 
inner quarters where possible and rarely had interaction with those outside of their 
immediate family. Once they were married, they were expected to bear out any abuse 
they suffered and not return to their natal home. Those women who did attempt to return 
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home were called hwanghyang nyŏ, a term which initially referred to women who 
returned to Korea after being sent as tributes to China and Manchuria,101 further 
connecting their shame with the dereliction of a woman’s perceived duty and loyalty to 
her household. 
 The patriarchal structure of the Korean Confucian household transformed a 
woman’s body and chastity into the property of the man of the house, and therefore, any 
violation of a woman’s person was viewed as a violation of the man’s property, and the 
woman’s individual personhood denied. The woman’s pain and suffering were totally 
disregarded and instead, many women were thrown from their homes for bringing shame 
to the house. When Mun Okchu returned home, she was almost immediately rejected by 
her family: “I had only been back a short while when my aunt by marriage – my uncle’s 
wife – visited and said they couldn’t allow someone like me to stay at home and disgrace 
the family. I was not treated as a human being by my relatives.”102 Stories like these are 
not uncommon and demonstrate Korean society’s overwhelming concern with chastity 
and reputation. The families of the victims did not care what tortures the former comfort 
women had suffered, only that their bodies had been defiled, and that they therefore 
brought shame to the family. 
Most of the women never married, could never have children, or suffered in their 
married life, often from the abuse of their husbands, or the men they were living with. 
Mun P’ilgi said of her companion: “He drank every day. He caused me much mental pain. 
He had already been married, and had children, but he initially kept this a secret from me. 
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I tried to leave him many times, but always in vain. We lived together without getting 
married, and in the end he died of an illness, leaving me just his debts.”103 Some were 
mentally or physically abused by husbands who knew their backgrounds. Even those who 
ended up with families and a generally well-off life felt the lack of support from their 
relatives. Kim Tŏkchin (a pseudonym for Kim Sun-dŏk, who later identified herself 
under her true name) stated in her interview:  
I went to one of my nephews, my brother’s son, a high school teacher, whom I 
had helped to educate. I told him about my past and asked if I should register at 
the Council. He said “You know how the case of the Survivors Association of the 
Pacific War led to nothing. You will only bring trouble on your family and your 
children will be traumatized.” He pleaded with me not to register. I discussed the 
matter with another nephew living in Taejŏn. He wept as he listened to my story 
and advised me not to register. He said “It will break your son’s heart. What will 
your stepson in the United States say when he hears all this?”104 
 
Even these men, whom Kim felt close enough to that she could share her woe, urged her 
to conceal her experiences to avoid the mental trauma and social stigma it would bring 
her family. Kim ultimately decided to register with the Council and tell her story as she 
had been unable to sleep since hearing the story of the first comfort woman to step 
forward, Kim Haksun, and had been suffering from the need to tell her story. Naturally, 
this lack of support from family members and those around her would be discouraging 
for any woman who might feel compelled to discuss her experiences as a comfort woman. 
As George Hicks wrote, “Given the moral value attached to chastity, the comfort women 
invariably emerged from their wartime experiences defiled, yet unable to accuse their 
abusers…From the patriarchal point of view, it was seen almost as a kindness to the 
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comfort women to pretend that this systematic brutalisation had never taken place.”105 
 Although women’s status has slowly changed over the years, there are still 
overtones of patriarchal dominance in modern society, as seen above in the nephews’ 
concern more for the effect of Kim’s story on Kim’s sons, and less for Kim’s continuous 
suffering. There is still some reticence to discuss the comfort women issue outside of an 
extreme, anti-Japanese, postcolonial rhetoric. The Korean state itself has found it 
particularly difficult to face up to its own history and involvement with the comfort 
women issue until recent years; even then, collaboration is rarely discussed, and the 
patriarchal repression that led to the problem in the first place is certainly never aired in 
public. 
  A significant number of the comfort women’s stories include a Korean procurer 
for the Japanese, whether s/he be a family friend, a relative, village headman, or a 
complete stranger. Some women were sold to pay off debt. Many of the private station 
owners were Korean and sold their own country-women into sexual service. The Korean 
state would like to portray the Japanese as the sole perpetrators of the comfort women 
system, but this is a whitewashed view of Korean participation in the system. That is not 
to say that all of the Koreans involved were money-grubbing or simply out to benefit 
from the misfortune of others in the midst of a war. Due to the colonization of Korea and 
the Japanese stranglehold on the police and nearly every aspect of the Korean economy, 
few had other options. However, this does not detract from the fact that the state and its 
citizens were indeed involved in the detainment of women as sex slaves and profited 
from the comfort stations. This does not fit in with modern Korea’s nationalist narrative 
and vitriol against Japan for acts committed during colonization and war, and so Korean 
                                                           





involvement is glossed over in nearly all discussions of the comfort women. 
 Another aspect that is rarely mentioned is the women’s agency. In many cases, 
the women left home because they were repressed by the male figures in their lives. Mun 
P’ilgi wanted an education. The one time she attended school and her father found out, he 
“rushed into my classroom, dragged me home and burnt all my books…He beat me and 
threw me out of the house, and I had to stay at my uncle’s for a while.”106 As Mun later 
states, “If I had been a boy I would have been able to study as much as I wanted.”107 Mun 
was enticed to leave home by a Korean recruitment agent of the Japanese when he 
offered her the chance to receive an education. In a rural society in which a woman’s 
education was viewed as useless and leading to disobedient thoughts, Mun’s desire to 
receive an education was actively curbed by  her father, and as a result, she took what she 
thought was her only opportunity for independence and escape from the hard manual 
labor of a rural farmer. The agent’s offer of a place to earn money and educate herself 
never materialized, and Mun found herself trapped in a comfort station.  
 In other cases, women were attempting to escape abject poverty. Most of the 
comfort women came from the lower classes, the extreme poor, and were seeking a way 
to earn money for their families or for themselves. They were therefore easy targets for 
promises of employment. The point here, however, is not just that the women were 
deceived, which has been the prevailing take away from the comfort women’s stories; 
what has been ignored in Korean society are the circumstances the women lived in that 
forced them to leave their homes in the first place. In a modernizing society, through 
forced modernization by the Japanese colonial overlords, Korean women witnessed some 
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of the freedom that existed for women outside of the so-called “Hermit Kingdom.” They 
were striving to achieve that independence and self-determination for themselves, 
pushing against the Confucian bounds that had been placed around women. Blame does 
not lay at the door of these women who were simply seeking better lives for themselves; 
blame lies with the society that created situations in which they were susceptible to 
victimization by recruiters. 
As with the comfort women, quite a few Korean brothel owners found themselves 
back in desperate straits at the end of the war. C. Sarah Soh lists a few testimonies by 
Korean women describing how they suffered when Japan lost. One female brothel owner 
in Taiwan lost all of the money she had earned when she returned home, stating, “I feared 
the retaliation of the Taiwanese.”108  Another woman was beaten and robbed by the 
Chinese, despite having paid off her debt and escaped her comfort station to start her own 
small business. This woman had done nothing to the Chinese, but she was a Japanese 
imperial subject, and so in the eyes of those who attacked her, she was the same as the 
Japanese who had plundered their country.  In the same way, a woman by the name of Ha 
Yŏng-i was robbed by the Indonesians. She had been a comfort woman who married the 
proprietor of the station where she labored. Therefore, she not only suffered through 
coercive recruitment and forced sexual labor as a comfort woman, but she was also 
victimized by the Indonesians in retaliation for a system in which she had also 
suffered.109  These women, despite having been kept under the heel of Japanese rule, 
were still associated with the Japanese Imperialists at the end of the war. In the case of 
those who had also been comfort women, they were victimized twice over, and then a 
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third time when they returned home to the degradation of being labeled a collaborator or 
a comfort woman.  
These are truths that are hard to bear for the Korean side of the issue, and as such 
are rarely mentioned in public discourse. The failure of the South Korean government to 
discuss alternative narratives in the lives of the comfort women removes these women’s 
agency because ultimately, it is not the woman who matters, or her story or her pain, but 
the men of Korean society and how the issue reflects on them. In other words, gender 
matters to the driving nationalism the comfort women narrative has created in so far that 
women’s voices do not matter unless they are serving a political agenda for the men. 
 Furthermore, until recently, South Korea was under a constant military regime, 
first under Syngman Rhee from 1948 to 1960, then under Park Chung-hee from 1961 to 
1979, and finally under Chun Doo-hwan from 1979 to 1988. Many of those in these 
governments were themselves collaborators under the Japanese colonial government who 
had retained power following military coups, and were less than interested in punishing 
fellow collaborators or opening themselves to possible repercussions. It was far more 
important to build national legitimacy for regimes that had no inherent legitimacy and to 
create a nationalism that would allow the state to drive the populace as needed to push 
through its reforms. As South Korea was in the process of restructuring itself post-Korean 
War and building an economy to enter the top ten of the world in less than fifty years, 
dealing with the fallout of World War II and the comfort women was not considered. In 
addition, as South Korea (and many other Asian countries) received and are currently 
receiving developmental financial aid from Japan following the Treaty on Basic 





with their benefactor. For these reasons, the government resolutely ignored the comfort 
women issue. It is only with the arrival of democracy in Roh Tae Woo’s presidency in 
the early 1990s that these long-suppressed issues have been able to come to national 
prominence. 
 Those who now raise the specter of Korean collaboration or, more importantly, 
of any form of kindness or affection between the Japanese soldiers and the comfort 
women, in the face of rampant anti-Japanese nationalism, are shouted down by the 
Korean Council and other activist supporters. For example, Kim Sun-dŏk was taken to 
Japan in the early 1990s to give testimony. While there, she sought out Izumi, an officer 
she met while working as a comfort women (full story below). Her actions showed a 
level of affection for the Japanese soldier who had used her for her sexual services that 
the Korean Council found to be “embarrassing.”110 She was subsequently not asked back 
on any return trips to Japan.  
The memory of Korean collaboration and repression and Japanese kindness does 
not fit well with the paradigmatic story the humanitarian activists are trying to tell. That 
story is a black and white tale of debauchery and violence, with no saving graces for the 
Japanese who participated in the system. When the comfort women finally felt confident 
and safe enough to step forward and speak out with the beginning of true democracy in 
South Korea, that story is the story that was chosen as the most damaging to Japan, the 
story that displays the utter worst of the violence. The comfort women system was 
without doubt a transgression against human rights and showcased the worst of humanity. 
However, ignoring the many different sides of the story in favor of nationalistic saber 
rattling invalidates the multiple experiences of these women. 
                                                           





As discussed above, the Japanese were not the sole perpetrators in the comfort 
system. Many Koreans were complicit, whether out of greed or coercion, and were often 
the ones to beat and abuse the comfort women at the stations they ran. This is rarely 
mentioned by humanitarian activists. The stories of those like Kim Sun-dŏk (Kim 
Tŏkchin), who kept in touch with one of her clients even after the war was over, are 
rarely told. Not only did Kim come to love this man, but he helped her and four others 
leave the comfort station, arranging for their safe passage all the way back to Korea. She 
continued to send him gifts throughout the war, and their correspondence only stopped 
with the cessation of his letters two years before the end of the war, possibly due to his 
death or disappearance. She kept the letters until they were burned during the Korean 
War.111 Such affection and kindness mars the story of continuous and unrelenting abuse 
that the Korean side of the debate is portraying, and so is rarely heard. 
The beginning of this paradigmatic story’s creation lies in the buildup to the 
International Public Hearing Concerning Japan’s Postwar Compensation (Nihon no sengo 
hoshō ni kansuru kokusai kōchōkai) on December 9th of 1992, in Tokyo.112 As Mitsui 
Hideko points out, “Efforts made by those who have been working in separate realms – 
historians, international human rights activists, and scholars in international law – 
converged during this event.”113 This varied group of specialists was attempting to bring 
the comfort women issue to the international stage and place it on par with other known 
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human rights violations. They specifically chose which stories to present and focus on, 
and chose the worst possible experiences to detail. The work of all the specialists 
involved, then, was geared toward a representational strategy that would “constitute a 
case worthy of attention in international arenas.”114 It is natural and unsurprising, then, 
the tenor that the testimonies chosen would take. 
 This, however, was the beginning of the prominence of the comfort women issue 
in South Korea, which coincided with the development of democratic government. Since 
that time, the succeeding governments after Roh Tae-woo’s tenure have picked up the 
issue and run with it, using it to fuel the campaign-machine and foreign policy initiatives. 
If there is one thing that the majority of Koreans can agree on, it is a hatred of the 
Japanese colonization and all of its ensuing results (except, of course, for the beginning 
of modernization). This is a fairly recent development. 
 
The Comfort Women and Japan 
Surprisingly, it has been the Japanese who have been most forthcoming with 
sympathetic scholarship since the end of the war. Soh points out that some books 
detailing the sufferings of the comfort women became best sellers in Japan in the 
1970s.115 It has only been since the early 1990s that the Neo-Conservative nationalists 
have raised their hackles and become loudly insistent on Japan’s so-called “normality” 
and lack of need for apology.  
One of the first arguments made was a denial of any involvement with the 
                                                           
114 Mitsui, 41. 
 






comfort women system by the Japanese government or military. That, however, was 
blown apart by the discovery of incriminating documents in the archive of the Self 
Defense Army Library by Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki in January of 1992. The day 
immediately following the publication of the documents, on January 12th, the Japanese 
government had no choice but to acknowledge its involvement.116 Since that time, Japan 
has issued several apologies, the most well-known of which is the Kōno Statement, 
issued by Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei in August of 1993, following a governmental 
investigation into the claims of the comfort women.117 In his statement, Kōno said,  
The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the 
establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort 
women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private 
recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government 
study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, 
through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military 
personnel directly took part in the recruitment. They lived in misery at comfort 
stations under a coercive atmosphere…. 
 Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military 
authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. 
The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend 
its sincerest apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, 
who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological 
wounds as comfort women.118 
 
This statement, as reproduced in part above, has been the fullest and most 
satisfactory apology to date. Kōno admitted to the government’s involvement in both 
recruitment and management of the facilities, and apologized directly to the comfort 
women themselves, acknowledging their individual pain. It also recognized that not all 
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damage is physical. As Yamazaki points out, the apology has been labeled as flawed for 
using the terms “some” and “in many cases” as if the abuse was not universal.119 
Arguably, however, the statement does not claim that the abuse was not universal; merely 
that the same tactics were not employed in every case, which is the truth. Whether one 
takes exception to the use of these words or not, the apology has stood to date as the most 
well-received and appreciated out of the many that have been issued. 
In the intervening years, Japanese politicians, and many Japanese citizens, have 
taken exception to other aspects of the comfort women’s claims. The issue now has not 
become whether the Japanese government and military were involved or not, but whether 
they were involved with forced recruitment, or if that was the sole prerogative of private 
procurers, many of whom were actually Korean. They point to a lack of evidence 
supporting the claim that the Japanese government was directly or indirectly involved in 
coercive recruitment. Those adhering to this argument take a positivist view of history: if 
there is no official documentation, then there is no proof. Ueno explains, “…official 
documents are valued more highly than private ones… oral tradition and testimony 
begins to have credibility only when they are backed up by other forms of 
proof…Positivist history is centred on documentary historical sources, and views the 
researcher as an objective outsider.”120 This view privileges documentary evidence over 
the testimonies of survivors, and claims to be completely objective because of that. 
However, it is well known that the Japanese government systematically destroyed 
documents at the end of the war, before the arrival of the Occupation Army. It is 
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unsurprising that incriminating evidence is difficult to find now, but that does not mean 
that it did not once exist, nor that its lack of existence disproves the testimonies of the 
women. Furthermore, as Ueno also mentions, official documentation is the product of 
bureaucracy.121 Official government documents are then the government’s interpretation 
and report of events and are not in themselves objective either. So the outcry against a 
lack of evidence is in many ways a futile argument. 
A further claim entered into the contentious debate is that Japanese women were 
also comfort women. It was not merely other ethnicities that suffered, and it certainly was 
not about racial discrimination. On the surface, this argument seems valid. However, 
Japan had a long established history of legalized prostitution. The state controlled 
prostitution, doling out licenses and requiring medical checkups. Also, the karayuki-san, 
traveling prostitutes, were widespread: “In the late nineteenth century and at the 
beginning of the twentieth, Japanese traveling prostitutes or karayuki, were to be found in 
many parts of Asia, including areas which later became Japanese-occupied territories. 
The export of women for sexual service was therefore not a new idea for the 
Japanese.”122  
The difference between these women and their Korean counterparts is that the 
Japanese women actually were prostitutes to begin with, unlike the young Korean girls 
who were coerced into service. The Japanese women often went willingly for the chance 
to get out of their contracts and find employment with better pay.123 They were older than 
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their non-Japanese companions and frequently carried venereal diseases themselves, 
making the young and virginal Koreans the preferred choice, and the less expensive one. 
That is not to say, of course, that the Japanese comfort women did not also suffer. 
Despite their profession being legalized in their native country, they still suffered 
ostracism. As Ueno states: “…the family itself was the stronghold where the masculinity 
of the soldiers of the Imperial Army was defined. In its shadow were the military comfort 
women who were forced to carry the burden of ‘whorishness’ as opposed to 
motherhood…”124 The Japanese women were equally forced to give up their 
independence and use their bodies to serve their patriarchal nation, sacrificing for the 
good of their country. This abuse of patriarchal power continues today when the Japanese 
government issues its response that the comfort women were just prostitutes. Their 
profession does not excuse the abuse they suffered, neither does it mean that sexual 
slavery did not take place, and it does not make rape an impossible proposition simply 
because they were paid, though in most cases they never saw the money they supposedly 
earned. However, once again, the gender of the victims is utilized against the victims 
themselves as their suffering is deemed less because they were forced into a role in which 
a “normal” woman would be ashamed to find herself. 
As these debates continue back and forth, the issue has become increasingly 
polarized in Japan with people taking one of two sides: those in support of the claims of 
the comfort women and those who believe apologies have already been made and that 
those apologies were damaging to Japan’s national pride anyway. Those such as 
Kobayashi Yoshinori, a cartoonist and right-wing spokesperson, speak out against what 
                                                           






they term a “masochistic” view of history, viewing “‘leftists,’ ‘intellectuals,’ 
‘individualists,’ ‘cultists,’ and, above all, ‘the media’”125 as responsible for the so-called 
treachery. The fight continues over national history textbooks (which are outside the 
scope of this paper but which add fuel to the debate) and how much should be said about 
the comfort women. Those of Kobayashi’s ilk would prefer none at all.    
Neo-Conservatives are bent on eliminating any mention of the comfort women 
from history textbooks, claiming that any mention of the comfort system in middle school 
texts is not age appropriate and that bringing up such an unsavory past dishonors Japan 
and creates a negative self-image for young Japanese. Naturally, this has enraged Korea 
and China, as well as other Asian countries who suffered under Japanese colonial rule, 
and the redaction and ignorance of these historical facts in favor of patriotic flag-waving 
has caused old animosities to bubble over from the simmer at which they constantly 
remain.   
 
Recanting the Yoshida Seiji Articles and Dismissing Comfort  
Women’s Testimony 
All these debates have been brought to the fore again with the retraction of a 
series of articles written by the Asahi Shimbun concerning the memoirs of Yoshida Seiji. 
In early August of 2014, the comfort women issue suffered a cutting setback in Japan as 
one of the last remaining left-leaning news sources (left-leaning being entirely relative, as 
the Japanese left is not very far off center), the Asahi Shimbun, published a retraction of 
former articles predicated on the testimony of Yoshida Seiji, a former Armed Forces 
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member. Yoshida had admitted to kidnapping over 200 women for the purpose of 
servicing comfort stations. Although his account had already been proven false, the paper 
had not renounced its stories.126 The Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi’s rival paper, published 
its own maliciously joyful article covering the renouncement, which will be discussed 
here. 
 At the time of the initial publication of Yoshida’s story, a member of the Japanese 
Imperial Army coming forward and openly discussing the forcible recruitment methods 
of the military was shocking, standing in direct opposition to the government’s claims of 
total innocence with regard to the establishment of comfort stations. Though the comfort 
women’s stories were slowly being brought to light throughout the seventies and eighties, 
they had had little noticeable impact. It was not until the early nineties and the emergence 
of humanitarians concerned with international human rights violations, as discussed 
above, that the comfort women themselves began to step forward and protest their 
treatment both during and after the war. Along with these women’s brave testimonies, 
Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki and his discovered documents of direct government and 
military involvement in the setting up and maintenance of comfort stations throughout 
Japan’s occupied territories, beginning with the Sino-Japanese war in the thirties and 
continuing through the Asia-Pacific War, forced the Japanese government to admit its 
involvement. 
 However, there still remains some contention surrounding the issue. As discussed 
above, while the government admits to creating and maintaining the stations, it continues 
to insist that any coercion was committed by private brokers and not the military itself. 
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Yoshida’s memoir contradicted this stance, making it difficult to maintain. 
 With his second term as Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō has pushed to mitigate the 
responsibility of Japan for war time atrocities. He is among the camp of Neo-
Conservatives who believe that the discussion of these atrocities detracts from Japan’s 
national pride and would like to have all mention of the comfort women wiped entirely 
from the slate. It is understandable that he would feel that way, considering he is the 
grandson of Class A war criminal and former prime minister Kishi Nobusuke.127 
Unsurprisingly, the conservative media tends to side with him, as evidenced by the 
vitriolic editorial of the Yomiuri Shimbun on the Asahi’s retraction.  
 In the very first sentence, the article already clearly demonstrates on which side of 
the issue the paper stands, terming the women “so-called comfort women.”128  This 
skeptical tone could either be taken to address the euphemistic “comfort” portion of the 
term, a word used to imply the women’s function as providing sexual “comfort” to the 
troops and obscuring the true violent nature of their service; or, it could be emphasizing 
skepticism about the survivors’ service as a whole. Given the stance of the rest of the 
article, and the Yomiuri Shimbun as a news source, the editorial is more likely directing 
doubt toward the women themselves. It goes on to state that the Asahi has retracted its 
statements “albeit partially,”129 implying that the Asahi actually has much more to retract 
and apologize for, indicating the supposedly shoddy nature of their reporting. 
 The Yomiuri laments that the Asahi’s reporting has caused international 
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misperception of Japan and has aggravated the ill-feelings between Japan and South 
Korea (the relationship with North Korea is also tense, but for a slew of other reasons in 
addition to the comfort women issue). The strained relationship with South Korea, 
however, is not due to Yoshida or the Asahi’s reporting. South Korea has a number of 
reasons to distrust and dislike Japan, stemming from Japan’s annexation of the peninsula. 
The comfort women issue began to become a major part of the discussion between the 
two countries in the early nineties, coinciding with the publication of Yoshida’s memoirs 
and the publication of Asahi’s articles, it is true, but Yoshida was not the reason the issue 
became prevalent. Rather, it was a shift in international perception of violence against 
women and war time rape. Women began to speak out about the injustices they suffered. 
To claim that Yoshida and the Asahi Shimbun were instrumental in the formation of the 
world’s perception of Japan is to ignore the efforts and struggles of comfort women 
survivors and women’s rights activists, thereby attempting to invalidate all the work they 
have put in to the comfort women issue. Furthermore, Yoshida is far from the only one to 
testify to the forcible recruitment of comfort women; but, he was a part of the military, 
male, and Japanese, and so his confessions carried more weight to the Japanese. Being 
able to negate his statements means that the Japanese Right is once again free to sweep 
the comfort women under the rug. 
 Yoshida’s remarks in a global context are once again brought up in reference to 
Radhika Coomaraswamy’s report to the UN Human Rights Commission, known simply 
as the Coomaraswamy Report, seeming to also invalidate Coomaraswamy’s conclusions. 
Yoshida was certainly not the only voice to be raised in this report, and it is a logical 





rest of the report does not hold merit. The entire Yomiuri article, in fact, suffers from this 
fallacy, crowing in triumph over the retraction of one man’s contribution and ignoring the 
numerous other documents and testimony to the same effect.  
 Later in the article, the Yomiuri points out the problem with the conflation of the 
Women’s Voluntary Service Corps (termed in the article simply as “female volunteer 
corps”) and the comfort women. The Asahi does make a mistake here, though the mistake 
is in claiming that the two are “completely different”130 in their retraction. While it is true 
that not all Voluntary Service Corps members were made into comfort women, it is also 
true that there were those who were told they were joining the Corps to find work in 
factories and similar occupations, but were taken to comfort stations. As George Hicks 
states: “The Women’s Voluntary Service Corps was ostensibly (and, to some extent, 
actually) directed towards labour service in essential war industries. The women were, 
however, sometimes diverted into prostitution and the Women’s Voluntary Service Corps 
became so identified with it that the women who actually did work in factories have been 
reluctant to acknowledge their membership of the Corps.”131 It is essential to recognize 
the difference between regular Service Corps members used solely for labor and those 
forced into prostitution, as discussed above, but it is also critical that it be remembered 
that the Service Corps sometimes stood as a mask for the recruitment of comfort women. 
Deception is, after all, a form of coercion. If the Yomiuri can claim that the two were 
“completely different,” then they can maintain that forced recruitment for sexual slavery 
did not take place. 
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 In the penultimate section of the article, the Yomiuri points out the Asahi’s 
statements that “great importance must be attached to the fact that those women were 
caught in a situation marked by ‘a coercive nature’ with which they had been “deprived 
of freedom.’”132 The article argues that the use of women to satiate Japanese soldier’s 
sexual needs and the question of military involvement in forcible recruitment are separate 
issues, which is blatantly untrue. One cannot exist without the other, and one happened 
due to the perceived necessity of the other. They are inextricably tied. The article’s 
attempt to dismiss the Asahi’s concern for the forced retention of the women at the 
comfort stations is also ignoring reality. There are numerous stories of women attempting 
to flee and being beaten, or, at worst, killed. In many cases, the women were not allowed 
to move out of their compound, and when they were, it was at certain times and under 
supervision. To disregard the coercive nature of these women’s experiences is to dismiss 
the testimony and suffering of these women. However, that is exactly what the 
government wants. 
 Abe Shinzō has already publicly considered withdrawing the Kōno Statement. 
Abe’s remarks caused deep concern in not only South Korea, but in China and all over 
Asia as well, as most areas under occupation were forced to participate in Japanese war 
time activities, the women made into prostitutes and the men into soldiers. The uproar 
caused him to backpedal, and to date no retraction has been made, but the fact that he 
would even consider making such a statement is proof of his stance toward the comfort 
women. If he could erase their testimonies, he would. 
 The article concludes that though the relationship with South Korea is strained, 
the South Korean president, Park Geun-Hye, is not going to back down and so neither 
                                                           





should Japan. The issue here is the weight of the evidence against Japan. The article calls 
for accurate history, as if all the proof of complicity and coercion on the part of the 
government was somehow fabricated, despite coming from the Self-Defense Agency’s 
own library. Neo-Conservatives are not merely burying their heads in the sand; they are 
trying to rewrite history from atop their soapbox and convince the rest of Japan that 
history as the rest of the world understands it is simply false and denigrating to national 
pride. This is nationalism at its horrible best, placing the pride of a country’s image 
before recognizing historical mistakes and sincerely apologizing for past actions, that 
those mistakes may never again be made. 
 What Neo-Conservatives also fail to recognize is that the negation of one man’s 
testimony does not immediately falsify all other testimonies to the same effect. As the 
Yomiuri and other right-wing sources cheer over false memoirs, they conveniently forget 
the many comfort women who have stepped forward to tell their tales. Of course, it is 
easy to dismiss them as simply looking for a pay-out, especially when testimonies change 
in the minor details. However, memory is not perfect after age and emotional turmoil 
have taken their toll. Even in their minor changes, the testimonies’ main points still stand: 
women were frequently, but not always, deceived and coerced into sexual servitude, 
either with promises of better jobs or better lives or by simple force, sometimes with the 
lives of their families at risk.  
 While the Yoshida retraction is a setback for the movement to extract a sincere 
apology and reimbursement from the Japanese government, it is a setback only in that the 
right-wing nationalists now have a concrete, well-known testimony to point to and 





and testimonials given, although, as with all politics, one needs only spin a single event to 
convince an uninformed reader that your truth is their truth. In the minds of those reading 
or hearing the news articles on the Asahi’s retraction, this throws shadows of doubt on 
other known testimonials. 
 More crucially, the importance given to Yoshida’s testimony and its subsequent 
disavowal further embroils gender identity in the issue. Yoshida was a Japanese male 
soldier; the victims are Korean women. Yoshida’s testimony was so powerful in the first 
place because of his gender and ethnicity. The fall of his legitimacy (despite being earlier 
discredited in 1992 by Hata Ikuhiko),133 therefore, became a far more serious problem 
than if one of the comfort women had been proven false. They are already under constant 
doubt and scrutiny due to the nondocumentary nature of their testimony and the 
accusations of fraud hurled at them by the Japanese conservatives. Yoshida’s falsehood 
was held up above the testimonies of the victims themselves and its renunciation is also 
equally more valuable to opponents of the comfort women.  
 The gender of the victims does matter because the abuse they suffered would not 
have happened to males. The systematic oppression experienced by women in both South 
Korea and Japan allowed for their signification as objects for sexual release rather than as 
persons in their own right with their own identities and desires. This oppression has 
continued today as their stories are not used to obtain the compassion, understanding, 
acknowledgment, and compensation they deserve. Rather, their testimonies are denied or 
dismissed by the Japanese government. The South Korean government ignores its own 
wrongdoing and that of its citizens in favor of politicizing the issue to build anti-Japanese 
nationalism and capture voters. It is not about the women, but about what the women’s 
                                                           





testimonies can do to further their political agenda. It is also not about finding truth in 
history, but about how the truths that are known can be spun to serve that political agenda. 
These women, the few who remain, are being used once again by largely male-dominated 
governments. It is not enough that their bodies and lives have been irreparably damaged; 
even their bids for compensation have been hi-jacked for purposes outside of their own 
peace of mind.  
 The renunciation of Yoshida Seiji’s memoirs and any articles connected to them 
in the Asahi Shimbun will prolong the struggle even further. It was already unlikely that 
any of these women would see the apology they seek in their lifetimes, and that goal has 
become even further away as the Japanese Neo-Conservatives retrench. The lack of a 
history that acknowledges all parties’ wrongdoings and faces the horror of the comfort 
women system head on continues to prevent any meaningful dialogue between the 
Japanese and the South Korean governments. Not all comfort women were coerced. Not 
all comfort women suffered debilitating abuse. Not all comfort women had unmitigated 
hatred and terror for the Japanese. Yet, the Japanese were deeply involved in all aspects 
of the comfort station system, and abused the comfort women to such a degree that the 
bodies and minds of many of these women are permanently damaged. Many Koreans 
were complicit in the system and just as abusive as the Japanese. Until the patriarchal 
governments of these two countries stop attempting to use the female experiences of the 
Asia-Pacific War to drive their own nationalism and agendas, and recognize that all 
history is not simply cut and dry, right and wrong, and that fault can lie with many parties 
without dismissing outlier testimonies, the few remaining comfort women will never see 






Korean women have been struggling against patriarchal oppression since the latter 
half of the Chosŏn dynasty. Many fought silently, if they fought at all, taking whatever 
power they could in the home but never raising their voices publicly. With the advent of 
public education, however, women began to demand emancipation from the patriarchal 
structure and the right to decide their own lives. Their education as understood by males, 
unfortunately, was not for the purpose of true liberation, but for the good of the nation; 
they were to remain in the private sphere, just more educated and better able to produce 
proper citizens of the nation. This was certainly not the first use of women to serve a 
political agenda, and it was not the last. 
 When women did begin to call for their liberation, the discourse of women’s 
movements was co-opted by nationalists. Women’s liberation was viewed as selfish and 
took away from the goal of freeing the nation. Once the nation was freed, women would 
be freed, and so they should work toward national liberation rather than their own 
personal liberation. Women who refused to relinquish their own ambitions and took the 
ideals of modernity to heart were denigrated as vapid whores and sexualized by males 
and in the media to delegitimize their behavior. They were easily dismissed, which 
allowed the patriarchy to bring back the Old-Fashioned Woman, a woman who knew her 
place in the home and would quietly serve to create the good sons that men desired. 





to invasive policies. Women were expected to multiply, regardless of the dangers to their 
health. Furthermore, many women were forced out of the home to find wage work to 
supplement their family incomes. Even those who left home to find independence and 
individual freedom suffered greatly for their ambition, either laboring under harsh labor 
conditions for little pay where they were kept in confinement under intense surveillance, 
or deceived into becoming comfort women. The Japanese colonial government used their 
bodies for cheap and expendable labor in their rapid industrialization of the peninsula and 
in the process, destroyed many of them. Korean men were often complicit in labor 
schemes such as these, many serving as foremen and managers at Japanese factories. 
 Women’s bodies were also used in sexual labor under the comfort system, where 
they suffered physical and mental abuse and were often scarred for life. The tragedy of 
these women is that they were shamed for their abuse when they returned home, and are 
being shamed for it now. They were ignored for decades and when they did finally come 
forward to testify, they were called liars and profiteers. Thankfully, their stories are being 
told now, but not all of their stories. Once again, a political agenda has warped these 
women’s intentions and taken from them the meaning of their struggles as some stories 
that do not fit the paradigm activists are trying to portray are being ignored or silenced. 
 It is horrendous to think that women’s minds, bodies, and histories are still being 
appropriated for political agendas. Many parts of colonial history are left in shadow as 
Korean men and the Korean government at large cover up the roles they played during 
colonization. They have gone over history with a brush to paint over that which makes 
them uncomfortable or does not fit their paradigm of ultra-nationalism and constant 





women’s lives which fit the story seeing the light of day. The comfort women are a 
highly visible example of this. It is incumbent upon historians and the governments of the 
countries involved to recognize their own history, no matter how difficult or shameful it 
may be. Women, past and present, have suffered long enough, and their lives should not 
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